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Probabilistic Duopoly with Differentiation By Attributes
Reynald-Alexandre Laurent∗
Abstract
This paper proposes a discrete choice duopoly in which products are described and differentiated
by their specific attributes. These attributes can be discrete characteristics or differences in continuous
variables, such as prices or qualities. Consumers follow a probabilistic reasoning which is consistent
with random decision rule models such as Tversky’s “Elimination By Aspects” framework (1972a,b).
This type of behavior is relevant for small everyday life purchases. The demand system provides
a general structure of product differentiation in which special cases are given by classical models
of horizontal and vertical differentiation. Existence and uniqueness of a price Nash equilibrium in
pure strategies are established in the duopoly. When attributes’ utilities vary, comparative statics
properties of profits can be explained by “attractiveness” and “differentiation” effects. These effects
are combined in a new way compared to the deterministic structures or to the logit duopoly. For
example, an increase in the low utility index of attributes strengthens product differentiation.
jel classification : D11, D43, L13.
Keywords : discrete choices, product differentiation, imperfect competition, Elimination By Aspects.
1 Introduction
The growing number of products available in the marketplace, together with the multiplication of
their attributes, makes consumers’ choice more and more difficult. However, many purchase decisions
for current products are taken in a few seconds. Confronted with a small decision in which the amount
of income locked up is limited, people frequently use decision heuristics instead of making a complete
examination of all the products. Heuristics are simple and time-saving rules of reasoning that reduce the
complexity of a decision-making problem. These rules are especially useful for consumers who make a
∗PSE, Paris School of Economics / Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques (CNRS, EHESS, ENS, ENPC). Contact:
CERAS-ENPC, 28 rue des Saints-Pères, 75007 PARIS or reynald.laurent@free.fr.
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lot of small choices, for example in the context of supermarket shopping. This observation is confirmed
by the marketing literature which studies consumers’ eye movements (Russo and Dosher, 1983), in-store
verbal protocols (Payne and Ragsdale, 1978) and information display boards (Lussier and Olshavsky,
1979).
This paper proposes representing this type of behavior into a duopoly by using a random decision
rule structure. In this class of discrete choice models, the utility assigned to the possible options is
deterministic, but the decision rule used by consumers is intrinsically probabilistic. Consumers are not
heterogeneous according to an individual characteristic, such as the intensity of preference for quality
(Mussa and Rosen, 1978), the income (Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979) or more generally an individual
preference: the heterogeneity of their behavior comes from the decision rule they use. As observed by
Tversky himself, “when faced with a choice among several alternatives, people often experience uncertainty
and exhibit inconsistency. That is, people are often not sure which alternative they should select, nor do
they always make the same choice under seemingly identical conditions” (1972a, p 281).
Some models belonging to this class assume that individuals process a small amount of information
because they focus on a single discriminating attribute, randomly chosen. The presence of a specific
attribute can trigger the purchase of a product, as in the “selection by aspects” model of Restle (1961).
For example, a specific brand name may be chosen immediately by a consumer without considering other
attributes. From an other perspective, several products can also be rejected if they do not possess a specific
attribute, as assumed in the “Elimination By Aspects” model of Tversky (1972). For example, all the
products not possessing a “fair trade” label may be eliminated by an ethical consumer. As shown by Payne
and Bettman (2001), these decision rules require less information processing than utility maximization and
are thus time-saving. This paper also suggests describing the products by their attributes, an approach
which recalls that of Lancaster (1966). In addition to the traditional discrete characteristics, linear
difference of continuous variables (prices, qualities) are represented as specific attributes, following an
idea of Rotondo (1986). Choice probabilities of this duopoly with differentiation by attributes (or “DBA”)
are both consistent with a selection and an elimination based on attributes.
An application of probabilistic choice models to imperfect competition has already been carried out
successfully, starting from the logit oligopoly of product differentiation proposed by Anderson, de Palma
and Thisse (1988, 1992). In this type of model, each option’s utility possesses a random variable, which
expresses changing state of mind or incapacity of the modeler to apprehend individual behaviors. These
random utility models (for a survey, see McFadden, 2001) provide a good description of consumers’ be-
havior for important purchases, such as cars, but are less relevant for small decisions, because it is simply
unlikely that consumers make a complete examination of all the characteristics and of all the products.1
1This observation is common to a new line of research that focuses on market interaction between rational firms and
imperfectly rational consumers. Recent examples include Chen, Iyer and Pazgal (2005) who analyze a model in which
consumers remember prices imperfectly. Spiegler (2006) supposes that consumers use a simple “anecdotical” reasoning.
Finally, Gabaix and Laibson (2006) study consumers buying a product and an add-on but who are not aware of the
add-on’s price.
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Fader and McAlister (1990) share this opinion by showing that the Elimination By Aspects model pro-
vides new insights for the analysis of the coffee market, compared to the logit model.
The main contributions of the paper are the followings. The demand system of the DBA model
leads to a general framework of product differentiation. First, when the specific attributes of the two
goods provide the consumers the same positive utility index, differentiation is horizontal. In this case,
the DBA model is formally equivalent to a quadratic address model (d’Aspremont et al., 1979) in which
a specific distribution of consumers’ preferences over the space of characteristics is considered. Second,
when a single product possesses all the specific attributes available on the market, and the other none,
differentiation is vertical. If products differ only by their qualities, the DBA model is formally equivalent
to the classical duopoly with asymmetric qualities (Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979; Tirole, 1988), in which
a specific distribution of consumers’ preference intensity for quality is used. This case of pure vertical
differentiation can not be represented in a logit duopoly with heterogeneous qualities. Third, when each
good has some specific attributes but that provide consumers different utility levels, the previous two
dimensions of differentiation are simultaneously taken into account. In the literature, such a double
differentiation has been analyzed by Neven and Thisse (1990), Economides (1993) and Irmen and Thisse
(1998). But in these models, the number of characteristics of differentiation is given a priori, whereas it
depends endogenously on attribute choices in the DBA model.
This demand system allows for a richer analysis than existing ones and the price Nash equilibrium
in pure strategies highlighted here also leads to new results. Indeed, a comparative statics analysis of
profits in the duopoly equilibrium reveals that the “attractiveness” and “differentiation” effects are com-
bined in a new way. In the DBA model, adding new specific attributes to the most preferred product
increases the vertical dimension of differentiation. The same improvement of the less-preferred product
converts the vertical dimension to a horizontal one but strengthens globally the differentiation. These
properties are not identical to those observed in classical models. In the deterministic duopoly with ver-
tical differentiation, the differentiation effect is always dominant. In the asymmetric binomial logit, only
the attractiveness effect matters. In a spatial framework, the two combined effects affect all the firms
identically, whereas firms’ incentives are asymmetric in the DBA model.
This paper is organized as follows. The DBA choice probabilities are presented in Section 2 and the
construction of demand functions detailed. Forms of product differentiation are analyzed in Section 3.
The existence of a price Nash equilibrium with one or two active firms is established in Section 4. Section
5 discusses the properties of the price equilibrium and compares them with the existing literature. The
comparative statics analysis of profits is carried out in Section 6. Our conclusions are presented in section
7. Some proofs are developed in the Appendixes.
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2 Demand functions with Differentiation By Attributes
This section presents the choice probabilities of the model with differentiation by attributes. The
aggregation of individual probabilities in order to construct demand functions is also discussed: these
functions are consistent with a form of heterogeneity of consumers’ preferences.
2.1 Choice probabilities
Consider a market in which two differentiated products are available. Each consumer is assumed to
purchase exactly one unit of one product. For example, a consumer knows that he should buy one packet
of coffee to satisfy his weekly needs. This assumption is acceptable on mature markets of differentiated
products whose supply side can be described by a discrete number of choice options. Moreover, each
purchase is a small decision for the consumer, such that his global income has no impact on his choice.
Assume that consumers follow a probabilistic reasoning based on products’ attributes such that their
behavior can be described by a random decision rule model. When two products are available, the
Selection By Aspects model of Restle (1961) and the Elimination By Aspects model of Tversky (1972)
are formally equivalent: as products are differentiated according to the specific attributes they possess, this
model is called “Differentiation By Attributes” (or “DBA”). In such a framework, it is traditionally easier
embodying discrete attributes, such as specific accessories or brand names, than continuous variables,
as prices or qualities. However, this difficulty is overcome by Rotondo (1986) who suggests representing
prices as attributes: more precisely, the relative advantage of an option over the other, in terms of price,
is given by a linear function of the price difference between these options.2 For aﬄuent consumers, the
general level of prices on the market does not really matter, whereas a price difference between products
is noteworthy. Indeed, buying the least expensive good allows saving a certain amount of money in the
perspective of a future expense. In other words, the price gap between the products is perceived by the
consumers as a specific attribute of the least expensive good.
In the DBA model, each product i is sold at a price pi, with i = {1, 2}. Its specific non-price attributes
provide consumers with utility ui. The attributes shared by the products are not taken into account as
they are useless for the decision making. The probability Pi of choosing i rather than j increases with
the specific non-price and (eventually) price attributes of i. Its expression depends on the price hierarchy
retained:
- if pi ≥ pj ,
P pi =
ui
ui + uj + pi − pj P
p
j =
uj + pi − pj
ui + uj + pi − pj (2.1)
- if pj ≥ pi,
2Representing a difference of continuous variables as an attribute is consistent with Tversky’s works (1977) on similarity.
Rotondo (1986) tests empirically several forms of price difference and finds that the linear function provides the more
realistic description of consumers’ behavior.
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P
p
i =
ui + pj − pi
ui + uj + pj − pi P
p
j =
uj
ui + uj + pj − pi (2.2)
The numerator of the probabilities represents all the specific attributes of the product considered. For
example, if pi ≥ pj , good i has only non-price specific attributes providing the utility ui, but if pj ≥ pi,
good i also possesses a price attribute, the price gap pj − pi. The denominator represents all the specific
attributes of the two products. These probabilities can be interpreted in two different ways. In the spirit
of Restle, Pi is the probability of choosing product i because it possesses a specific attribute. Following
Tversky, Pi may also represent the probability of eliminating j after having selected a specific attribute
of i as the elimination criterion.3
In a set of homogeneous goods (ui = uj = 0), the least expensive good is always selected. When
prices are identical, choice probabilities simply equal the utility index ratio:
Pi =
ui
ui + uj
Pj =
uj
ui + uj
In this special case, the DBA model is equivalent to that of Luce (1959).
2.2 A kinked demand curve
Consider now a market in which N consumers follow a probabilistic reasoning based on attributes: N
is supposed sufficiently high so that the expected demand functions are simply taken as effective by risk-
neutral firms. Observation of choice probabilities shows that demand functions Xi = NPi and Xj = NPj
are defined piecewise. Moreover, limpj→pi P
p
i = limpi→pj P
p
i = ui/(ui + uj) which demonstrates that
demand functions are continuous.
Their slopes are given by the following expressions:
∂Xpi
∂pi
=
−Nui
(ui + uj + pi − pj)2
∂X
p
i
∂pi
=
−Nuj
(ui + uj + pj − pi)2
Consequently, demand functions possess a kink in pi = pj when ui 6= uj but this kink vanishes when
ui = uj .
The study of concavity leads to the following result:
∂2Xi
∂p2i
∣∣∣∣
pi≥pj
=
2Nui
(ui + uj + pi − pj)3 > 0
∂2Xi
∂p2i
∣∣∣∣
pj≥pi
=
−2Nuj
(ui + uj + pj − pi)3 < 0
The demand is strictly concave as long as pj > pi but becomes strictly convex as soon as pi > pj . This
type of kink is not widespread in the literature but appears especially in models with “market inertia” or
3For a complete presentation of the Elimination By Aspects model, see Batsell et al. (2003).
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“switching costs” (Klemperer, 1987).
The following figure provides a representation of X1 when p1 varies under the assumptions N = 1,
p2 = 4, u1 = 4 and u2 = 1.
X1
0,7
p1
0,8
4 80 6
0,5
2
0,6
Figure 1: Demand function in the DBA model
Now and for the rest of the analysis, it is supposed that p1 ≥ p2 and these demand functions are used:
X1 =
Nu1
u1 + u2 + p1 − p2 (2.3)
X2 =
N(u2 + p1 − p2)
u1 + u2 + p1 − p2 (2.4)
Obviously, it will be necessary to check that equilibrium prices, if they exist, respect this condition
p1 ≥ p2.
2.3 Representative consumer and heterogeneous preferences
The probability aggregation used to construct demand functions does not impose that consumers have
exactly the same preferences on the products: the utilities ui of the non-price attributes are not required
to be identical for everyone.
Suppose that the population is divided into m = {1, ...,M} groups of consumers with∑Mm=1Nm = N ,
where Nm denotes the number of individuals in group m. The taste for specific attributes varies between
groups but not within each group: an agent of m obtains a utility uim by the consumption of product i.
Firms cannot discriminate between groups. In this case, if p1 ≥ p2, demand functions are given by:
X1 =
M∑
m=1
Nmu1m
u1m + u2m + p1 − p2 (2.5)
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and
X2 =
M∑
m=1
Nm(u2m + p1 − p2)
u1m + u2m + p1 − p2 (2.6)
These expressions can be simplified if the following global evaluation constraint is satisfied: the sum
of utilities of the specific non-price attributes is identical for each group of consumers.
2∑
i=1
uim =
2∑
i=1
uil ∀l 6= m (2.7)
This assumption means that each consumer’s valuation of the total set of attributes is equal but
that the distribution of a specific attribute’s utility varies between the groups. This assumption seems
acceptable when the number of attributes is sufficiently high: in this case, the global evaluation of all the
existing attributes is almost equivalent for everyone.
Links between demand systems are specified in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 When the global evaluation constraint (2.7) is verified, demand functions with hetero-
geneous preferences (2.5) and (2.6) are formally equivalent to functions (2.3) and (2.4) in which variables
u1 and u2 represent the weighted average utilities of specific attributes in the population of consumers.
Proof : By fixing u = u1m + u2m ∀m, demand functions become:
X1 =
M∑
m=1
Nmu1m
u+ p1 − p2 =
N
(
M∑
m=1
Nm
N
u1m
)
u+ p1 − p2
and
X2 =
M∑
m=1
Nmu2m +N(p1 − p2)
u+ p1 − p2 =
N
(
M∑
m=1
Nm
N
(u2m + p1 − p2)
)
u+ p1 − p2
Thereafter, if ui =
∑M
m=1(Nm/N)uim (weighted average utility of the specific attributes), one finds the
traditional expression of demand functions.
Finally, if the global evaluation constraint is respected, the DBA demand functions are consistent
with a specific form of preference heterogeneity.
3 Utility indices and types of differentiation
This section studies the forms of differentiation in the DBA model according to the utility values.
Links with classical demand systems of product differentiation are analyzed.
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3.1 Horizontal differentiation
In the duopoly framework, product differentiation is said to be purely horizontal if market shares are
identical Pi = Pj = 1/2 when products are sold at the same price. Each consumer purchases his preferred
variety.
A widespread example of a demand system with horizontal differentiation is given by the quadratic
address model proposed by Anderson et al. (1992), a generalization of the uniform quadratic model of
d’Aspremont et al. (1979). In this structure, two firms are located at the addresses x1 and x2 (firm 1
on the left) on a linear space of characteristics whose length is 1. The transportation cost t is assumed
quadratic and consumers are distributed according to a continuous and symmetric density function g,
which is centered at the middle of the segment (this condition guarantees that differentiation is purely
horizontal). Moreover, each consumer located at x chooses the variety i which maximizes his utility given
by:
Ui(x) = u− pi − t(x− xi)2
where u is the utility provided by the products independently of their variety and x − xi the distance
between the address of the consumer and that of the variety. The set of consumers preferring variety i is
defined in this way:
Mi = {x ∈ R/pi − pj ≤ t(xj − xi)(xj + xi − 2x), j 6= i}
Demand of product i is Xi =
∫
Mi
g(x)dx. When g is uniform and shares its bounds with the segment
of varieties, the classical model of d’Aspremont et al. (1979) is obtained. Assume now that firms are
located at the addresses xi = −1/2 and xj = 1/2 over the space of varieties. Then the position of the
marginal consumer, who is indifferent between varieties i and j, is given by:
x∗ =
pj − pi
2t
(3.1)
When the two firms are active, their demand functions are noted:
D1 =
∫ x∗
−∞
g(x)dx D2 =
∫ ∞
x∗
g(x)dx
As g is continuous, these demand functions are not kinked.
In the DBA model, probabilities equal P1 = P2 = 1/2 when prices are identical if and only if
u1 = u2 = u > 0. In this case, the specific attributes of the two products are appreciated in the same
way within the population of consumers. Demand of product i becomes:
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Xi =

Nu
2u+ pi − pj if pi − pj ≥ 0
N(u+ pj − pi)
2u+ pj − pi if pi − pj < 0
The demand functions of the symmetric DBA model are also not kinked. But the two systems do
not share only their properties, they can now be linked formally. Indeed, Anderson et al. (1992, chapter
4) showed that discrete choice models with n options can be linked with quadratic address structures in
highlighting a “n − 1”-dimensional distribution of consumers leading to the same demand functions. By
using expression (3.1), the price difference associated with the marginal consumer in position x can be
identified:
{pi − pj}(x) = ui − uj − 2tx (3.2)
Moreover, Anderson et al. (1992, p 112) show that the density function g can be obtained by the
following formula:
g(x) = 2Nlt
∂Pi
∂pj
∣∣∣∣
pi−pj={pi−pj}(x)
(3.3)
Proposition 2 The density function of consumers’ preferences in the Quadratic Address Model leading
to the symmetric DBA demand functions is unique and given by:
g(x) =

Ntu
2(u− tx)2 for x ≤ 0
Ntu
2(u+ tx)2
for x > 0
Proof : The first derivative of Pi is given by:
∂Pi
∂pj
=

u
(2u+ pi − pj)2 if pi − pj ≥ 0
u
(2u+ pj − pi)2 if pi − pj < 0
The price difference is substituted by its expression in (3.2) into the equation (3.3) to find the result of
the proposition. The DBA demand system can be easily constructed:
If pi ≥ pj ,
Xi =
∫ pj−pi
2t
−∞
Ntu
2(u− tx)2 dx =
Nu
2u+ pi − pj
If pi < pj ,
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Xi =
∫ 0
−∞
Ntu
2(u− tx)2 dx+
∫ pj−pi
2t
0
Ntu
2(u+ tx)2
dx
=
N
2
− 0 + N(u+ pj − pi)
2u+ pj − pi −
N
2
=
N(u+ pj − pi)
2u+ pj − pi
Demand functions of the symmetric DBA model are now obtained.
Function g is represented in Figure 2 for ui = uj = 2 and t = N = 1. This density is continuous,
symmetric and centered on 0: there are more consumers having a preference for intermediate varieties
in the space considered. For such a specific distribution of consumers, the spatial quadratic model is
consistent with the symmetric demand system of the DBA model.
g(x)
0,25
0,2
0,15
0,1
0,05
x
420-2-4
Figure 2: Density function of consumers in the Quadratic Address Model
3.2 Vertical differentiation
In the duopoly, product differentiation is said purely vertical if market shares are Pi = 1 and Pj = 0
when prices are equal. In this context, there exists a preference hierarchy between the two products.
The classical deterministic duopoly with vertical differentiation is provided by Gabszewicz and Thisse
(1979) who consider products possessing asymmetric qualities q1 and q2 (with q1 ≥ q2). Consumers are
heterogeneous in their willingness to pay σ for the quality, which is distributed according to a density
h into the interval [0;σ). Each consumer maximizes his utility and the function considered is assumed
similar to that proposed by Mussa and Rosen (1978):
Ui = σqi − pi
In this model, the preference intensity for quality σ˜ of the marginal consumer being just indifferent
between the two products equals:
10
σ˜ =
p1 − p2
q1 − q2 (3.4)
When the market is covered, demand functions are given by:
D1 =
∫ σ
eσ
h(σ)dσ D2 =
∫ eσ
0
h(σ)dσ
If h is uniform, the duopoly studied by Tirole (1988) is obtained.
In the DBA duopoly, differentiation is purely vertical when u1 > 0 and u2 = 0 (for identical prices,
probabilities are P1 = 1 and P2 = 0). In this case, product 1 possesses all the specific attributes on the
market and consumers prefer purchasing a product having additional useful attributes. But how to take
into account asymmetric qualities in the DBA model ? As explained previously, differences of continuous
variables can be integrated as specific attributes: for instance, a price difference is a specific attribute
of the low-priced product because it represents the monetary amount saved. This method can also be
employed for asymmetric qualities: the quality difference q1 − q2 is thus a specific attribute of the high-
quality good. When products differ only by their qualities, utility indices are given by u1 = q1 − q2 and
u2 = 0.
4 Differentiation by qualities is thus a special case of the DBA model in which choice probabilities
have the following expressions:
P1 =
q1 − q2
q1 − q2 + p1 − p2 (3.5)
P2 =
p1 − p2
q1 − q2 + p1 − p2 (3.6)
The demand system of the DBA model can be linked with the classical deterministic model of differ-
entiation by qualities. By using equation (3.4), it is possible to identify the price difference associated to
the marginal consumer:
{p1 − p2}(σ) = σ(q1 − q2) (3.7)
The density function h consistent with the choice probabilities Pi of the DBA model can be determined
by this method:
h(σ) = N(q1 − q2) ∂Pi
∂pj
∣∣∣∣
p1−p2={p1−p2}(σ)
(3.8)
Proposition 3 The density function of consumers’ preference intensity for quality in the deterministic
model leading to the DBA model with differentiation by qualities is uniquely defined on [0;∞[ and has the
following expression:
h(σ) =
N
(1 + σ)2
4The minimum level of quality q2 is shared by the two products and is not taken into account during the choice process.
Consequently, product 2 has no specific attributes.
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Proof : The first derivatives of choice probabilities (3.5) and (3.6) are given by:
∂P1
∂p2
=
∂P2
∂p1
=
q1 − q2
(q1 − q2 + p1 − p2)2
As these derivatives are equal, the density function is continuous. A substitution of the price difference
in the previous formula by its expression in (3.7) leads to the function h by using equation (3.8). The
bound σ can be determined by computing the demand for product 1:
X1 =
∫ σ
eσ
h(σ)dσ = N
(
σ
1 + σ
− p1 − p2
q1 − q2 + p1 − p2
)
Probability (3.5) is obtained for σ → +∞. Demand of product 2 is constructed in the same way:
X2 =
∫ eσ
0
g(σ)dσ = N
(
p1 − p2
q1 − q2 + p1 − p2
)
This proof is now completed 
The following figure represents this density when N = 1:
h
1
0,8
0,6
0,4
0,2
sigma
54310 2
Figure 3: Density function of preference intensity for quality
Consequently, when products are only differentiated by their qualities, the DBA model is formally
equivalent to the duopoly of Tirole (1988) with a non-uniform distribution. As many consumers have a low
willingness to pay for the quality, this function provides a good approximation of the income distribution
in the population of consumers.
3.3 Horizontal and vertical differentiation
When product differentiation is horizontal and vertical, the market share of the most appreciated
product belongs to ]1/2; 1[ and that of its rival to ]0; 1/2[. Suppose that each product possesses some
specific attributes providing utilities u1 > u2 > 0.
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In this case, choice probabilities become P1 = u1/(u1 + u2) > 1/2 and P2 = u1/(u1 + u2) < 1/2 when
prices are identical. Consequently, differentiation is horizontal up to the level u2, the specific attributes
of the two products providing the same utility, and vertical for a level u1 − u2, product 1 also proposing
additional attributes. Several settings may lead to these utility values. For example, if each variety
provides the utility u˜ but product 1 also proposes a higher quality q1 > q2, utilities of specific attributes
are given by u1 = u˜+ q1 − q2 and u2 = u˜, leading to u1 > u2 > 0.
Deterministic models with two-dimensional differentiation have already been proposed by Neven and
Thisse (1990), Economides (1993) and Irmen and Thisse (1998). But there are two important differences
between these structures and the model proposed here. First, the utility indices of the DBA model can
embody in a simple and endogenous way a large number of characteristics of differentiation. Deterministic
demand systems are more complex and can usually treat a limited number (fixed a priori) of characteris-
tics of differentiation. In a multi-dimensional model, equilibrium analysis can generally not be carried out
when no characteristic is dominant, whereas the DBA model is not concerned by this limitation. Second,
modifying a utility index can affect the two forms of differentiation in the DBA model (for example, an
increase of u2 reduces vertical differentiation and increases the horizontal one), which provides a good
description of firms’ choice of specific attributes. Conversely, in deterministic models, each variable affects
only one dimension of differentiation.
3.4 A comparison with the logit duopoly
The logit duopoly of product differentiation supposes that consumers choose the variety maximizing
the utility U˜i = u − pi + ε where u is the deterministic utility of each variety and ε a random variable
following the Gumbel distribution. In this case, choice probabilities are given by (Anderson et al., 1992,
chapter 7):
P1 =
exp((p2 − p1)/µ)
1 + exp((p2 − p1)/µ) ; P2 =
1
1 + exp((p2 − p1)/µ) (3.9)
where µ > 0 is a finite parameter correlated with the variance of the distribution. When prices are
identical, market shares verify P1 = P2 = 1/2, which means that differentiation is purely horizontal.
However choice probabilities in (3.9) are not equivalent to that of the DBA model. Indeed, the unique
density function of preferences realizing the equivalence between the logit and the Quadratic Address
Model (Anderson et. al, 1992, p 118) is not identical to the function highlighted in proposition 2 for the
DBA model.
Asymmetric qualities can be introduced in the logit duopoly in which case utilities become U˜i =
u+ qi − pi + ε and choice probabilities are given by:
P1 =
exp((q1 − q2 + p2 − p1)/µ)
1 + exp((q1 − q2 + p2 − p1)/µ) ; P2 =
1
1 + exp((q1 − q2 + p2 − p1)/µ)
Here again, no equivalence can be established with probabilities (3.5) and (3.6) of the DBA model or
with demand functions (2.3) and (2.4). When prices are identical, market shares are P1 = exp((q1 −
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q2)/µ)/(1 + exp((q1 − q2)/µ)) and P2 = 1/(1 + exp((q1 − q2)/µ)). For asymmetric and finite levels of
quality, choice probabilities never equal 1: consequently, the setting of pure vertical differentiation can
not be represented in the logit duopoly. The introduction of heterogeneous qualities adds a vertical
differentiation in the model but does not make the existing horizontal dimension disappear. Thus, the
DBA model provides a more general description of product differentiation than the logit duopoly.
4 Existence and uniqueness of the price equilibrium
In the DBA model, one or two firms can be active at the price equilibrium.
4.1 Profits
Firms play a non-cooperative game of price determination in which strategies belong to the set Si ⊆
R+. Suppose that each firm bears a unit cost ci and a fixed cost Fi, the latter being sufficiently weak to
guarantee the positivity of profits, of which here expressions:
- if pi ≥ pj ,
Πi =
Nui(pi − ci)
ui + uj + pi − pj − Fi (4.1)
- if pj ≥ pi,
Πi =
N(ui + pj − pi)(pi − ci)
ui + uj + pj − pi − Fi (4.2)
4.2 Duopoly equilibrium
The concept of Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is used here. Thus, in this duopoly, a “price
equilibrium” is a price vector (p∗1; p
∗
2) such that each firm i (i = {1, 2}) maximizes its profit for the value
p∗i of pi conditionally to the price pj (j 6= i) set by the other firm j. Formally, this means that:
Πi(p
∗
i , p
∗
j ) ≥ Πi(pi, p∗j ) ∀pi ∈ Si, ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2} , i 6= j
Caplin and Nalebuf (1991) showed that if 1/Xi is increasing and convex with prices, then profit is
quasi-concave and existence of a price equilibrium is guaranteed. However, as shown in section 2.2, the
DBA demand functions do not respect this property.
In order to demonstrate the existence of the equilibrium, firms’ best response functions are studied.5 I
begin with establishing the local best response function of firm i for a given price pj , according to whether
i chooses pi ≤ pj or pi ≥ pj . It follows from this analysis that the “global” best response functions,
established afterwards, depend on the hierarchy between ui and uj . These functions are presented in
Lemma 4.
5An alternative method consists in determining local equilibrium on an interval and to check if this local equilibrium is
global. This method obviously leads to the same result, but at the cost of a bit more tiresome calculations and of a less
compact presentation.
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Lemma 4 Best response functions p∗i (pj) and p
∗
j (pi) of firms i and j have the following expressions:

p∗i (pj) = p˜i if pj >
ui(ui + uj)
uj
+ ci or pj =
ui(ui + uj)
uj
+ ci and ui > uj
p∗i (pj) = pj if ui + uj + ci < pj <
ui(ui + uj)
uj
+ ci and ui > uj
p∗i (pj) ∈ [pj ; +∞[ if pj = ui + uj + ci
p∗i (pj)→ +∞ if pj < ui + uj + ci
p∗j (pi) = p˜j if pi > 2
√
uiuj + cj
p∗j (pi) = p˜j or p
∗
j (pi)→ +∞ if pi = 2
√
uiuj + cj and ui > uj
p∗j (pi) ∈ [pi; +∞[ if pi = 2
√
uiuj + cj and ui = uj
p∗j (pi)→ +∞ if pi < 2
√
uiuj + cj
with p˜i = ui + uj + pj −
√
uj(ui + uj + pj − ci) and p˜j = ui + uj + pi −
√
ui(ui + uj + pi − cj)
Proof: the proof is presented in Appendix 1.
The study of intersections of global best response function is used to demonstrate the existence and
uniqueness of the price equilibrium.
Proposition 5 There exists a Nash price equilibrium verifying pi ≥ pj, with i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i 6= j, if
and only if:
ui ≥ uj (4.3)
and
ci − cj ≥ √uiuj − ui (4.4)
Moreover, this equilibrium is unique.
Proof: the proof is presented in Appendix 2.
This proposition does not guarantee the existence of an equilibrium for all the values of parameters:
when the condition (4.4) is violated, a monopoly equilibrium may exist, as it will be shown in section 4.3.
The existence of the duopoly equilibrium can be easily understood by studying representations of best
response functions. Their form being not identical when ui > uj and when ui = uj , these two cases are
distinguished.
First, when ui > uj , the existence of the duopoly equilibrium is not guaranteed for all the cost
variables: examples of existence and non-existence are represented in the following figure. Solid curve is
the best response function of firm i and dashed line that of firm j.
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Figure 4: For ui > uj , existence of the equilibrium (left) and non-existence (right)
When uj → 0, the threshold (ui(ui + uj)/uj) + ci goes to infinity and the best response function of i
merges with the 45 ◦ line for pj > ui + uj + ci. The equilibrium exists if the unit cost of i is higher than
that of j, which is intuitive. However, firm j may also have a higher unit cost than that of i because
√
uiuj − ui ≤ 0 but the gap of unit costs should be weak (a higher gap leads to the configuration in the
right figure). This Nash equilibrium is weak in the sense that firm i could make the same profit by choos-
ing another price belonging to the interval [pj ; +∞[: the intersection is located on the strictly vertical
part of firm i’s best response function. The non-existence of a monopoly equilibrium being established,
the uniqueness of this duopoly one is demonstrated.
Second, when ui = uj = u, the existence of the price equilibrium is always guaranteed. Figure 5
depicts this equilibrium for symmetric and asymmetric unit costs. Best response function of firm i never
merges with the 45 ◦ line.
Figure 5: For ui = uj , equilibrium with asymmetric (left) and symmetric (right) unit costs
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4.3 Limit pricing monopoly equilibrium
If the firm selling the most appreciated product also possesses a large unit costs advantage, condition
(4.4) in Proposition 5 is violated and there is no equilibrium with two active firms. The study of market
configuration in this case leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 6 Suppose that the equilibrium condition (4.4) is not verified : ci− cj < √uiuj −ui with
ui ≥ uj. A monopoly equilibrium with limit pricing exists if and only if ui > uj = 0.
Proof: the proof is presented in Appendix 3.
When ui > uj = 0, firm i selects pi = cj and makes a profit Π
∗
i = N(cj− ci). This type of equilibrium
has already been highlighted in deterministic models of vertical differentiation: firm j can never obtain a
positive profit because its unit cost is too high to compete with i. However, this property is not kept when
uj > 0: firm j can always attract some consumers with the specific attributes of its product, even for
high values of pj , and thus make a positive profit. In this case, there are neither duopoly nor monopoly
equilibria in pure strategies.6
5 Properties of the price equilibrium in the DBA duopoly
This section compares the equilibrium prices in the DBA model with that of various models of product
differentiation. When unit costs are asymmetric, a “reference price” effect is highlighted. Moreover, it
is shown that the firm selling the most appreciated product obtains the highest market share and the
highest profit if the utility gap is larger than the unit cost gap.
5.1 What type of differentiation?
The equilibrium settings are studied for symmetric unit costs c1 = c2 = c.
Pure horizontal differentiation. When u1 = u2 = u > 0, equilibrium prices p1 = p2 = 2u + c are higher
than unit costs and profits are given by Π∗1 = Π
∗
2 = Nu. These prices are similar to that of the Hotelling
(1929) model or of the logit duopoly (Anderson et al. 1992, p 225).
Pure vertical differentiation. When u1 > 0 and u2 = 0, equilibrium prices in the duopoly are given by
p∗1 = c+ (u1(1 +
√
5))/2 and p∗2 = c+ u1. The firm selling the most appreciated product sets the highest
price. When the only difference between products is an asymmetric quality, utility indices are u1 = q1−q2
and u2 = 0: moreover, equilibrium prices become p
∗
1 = c + ((q1 − q2)(1 +
√
5))/2 and p∗2 = c + q1 − q2.
Similar expressions can be obtained in deterministic duopolies with vertical differentiation. Profits are
6The price tâtonnement of firms can generate a cycle similar to that of Edgeworth (1925) with a progressive multi-steps
downward phase and an abrupt ascending phase.
17
noted: Π∗1 = N(q1 − q2) and Π∗2 = N(
√
5− 1)(q1 − q2)/(
√
5 + 1).
Vertical and horizontal differentiation. When u1 > u2 > 0, equilibrium prices are p
∗
1 = c+((u1+
√
∆)/2)
and p∗2 = c + u1 + u2 with ∆ = u
2
1 + 4u1(u1 + u2). As there is no “dominant characteristic” in the
DBA model, expressions of equilibrium prices are less complex than in multi-dimensional models (see, for
example, Neven and Thisse, 1990). The two prices increase with ui and uj because price competition is
relaxed when non-price attributes are more essential for consumers. Note that the high-quality firm does
not necessarily choose the highest price for its product. Suppose that good 2 possesses a quality advantage
such that u2 = q2 − q1, whereas product 1 is endowed with a different specific attribute providing the
utility u1 : when u1 > u2, firm 1 sets the highest price for its low-quality product. On the coffee market,
fair trade products have sometimes a lower quality than that of some rivals but are sold at a higher price.
This observation can be explained by the DBA model, simply by considering that fair trade label is a
specific attribute more appreciated than the quality difference in the population of consumers. Finally,
profits have the following expressions Π∗1 = Nu1 and Π
∗
2 = N(u1 + u2)(
√
∆− u1)/(
√
∆+ u1).
No differentiation. When u1 = u2 = 0, any form of differentiation vanishes. The market outcome is
similar to a price competition à la Bertrand with homogeneous goods: p1 = p2 = c.
5.2 Asymmetric costs and reference price effect
When u1 ≥ u2 > 0, equilibrium prices are given by:
p∗1 =
u1 +
√
∆
2
+ c1 (5.1)
p∗2 = u1 + u2 + c1 (5.2)
where ∆ = u21 + 4u1(u1 + u2 + c1 − c2). At the outcome, firm 1 sets a higher price than its rival:
p∗1 ≥ p∗2 ⇔
√
∆ ≥ u1 + 2u2 ⇔ c1 − c2 ≥ u
2
2
u1
− u1
As u22/u1 ≤
√
u1u2 this inequality is always true when (4.4) is verified.
It could seem surprising that p∗2 increases with c1 and not with c2. The analysis of strategic interactions
between firms explains this unusual relation. When p1 increases, the local best response of firm 2 at the
equilibrium consists in increasing its own price (case J1 in Appendix 1, section 9.2). However, at the weak
Nash equilibrium, firm 1 is locally insensitive to a small price variation of p2 (case I3). This observation
recalls practices of pricing imitation like those described by Lazer (1957 p. 130-131), and particularly the
case in which the firm selling the high-quality good sets a reference price on the market. In this context,
the other firms choose the reference price minus a certain amount, which depends on the quality gap with
the reference firm.7
7Note however that information is perfectly symmetric in the concept of equilibrium used here.
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5.3 Equilibrium demands and profits
At the equilibrium, demand functions take the values:
X1 = NP
∗
1 =
2Nu1
u1 +
√
∆
; X2 = NP
∗
2 =
N(
√
∆− u1)
u1 +
√
∆
with again ∆ = u21 + 4u1(u1 + u2 + c1 − c2). Comparison of market shares leads to the following result:
X∗1 > X
∗
2 ⇔ c1 − c2 < u1 − u2 (5.3)
This condition underlines the importance of cost parameters in the determination of firms’ market
shares: the firm selling the most appreciated product (such that u1 > u2) obtains the largest market
share if the gap of differentiation is sufficiently high compared to the gap of costs.
A similar analysis can be realized on equilibrium profits given by:
Π∗1 = Nu1 − F1 ; Π∗2 =
N(u1 + u2 +∆c)(
√
∆− u1)√
∆+ u1
− F2
When fixed costs are identical F1 = F2, comparison of profits shows that:
Π∗1 ≥ Π∗2 ⇔ c1 − c2 < u1 − u2
Thus, if condition (5.3) is verified, the firm with the highest market share makes the highest profit.
Such a property has also been highlighted by Anderson and Renault (2006) in a general setting of duopoly
with vertical differentiation. When c1 = c2, the firm selling the most appreciated good always makes the
highest profit, a classical finding in models of vertical differentiation (Shaked and Sutton, 1982 ; Tirole,
1988 ; Choi and Shin, 1992 ; Wauthy, 1996). Moreover, there exists a convergence of firms’ goals in
the model: maximization of profit, i.e. short term objective, is consistent with maximization of market
share, i.e. long term objective. Such a convergence also exists in the “switching costs” models previously
mentioned (Farrel, 1986) or in the logit oligopoly (Anderson and de Palma, 2001).
6 Comparative statics properties of profits with the attributes
This section carries out a comparative statics analysis of the DBA profits when the utilities of the
specific attributes vary. Evolution of profits can be explained by an attractiveness and a differentia-
tion effects. A comparison with existing models is interesting as it highlights the new intrinsic logic of
differentiation by attributes.
6.1 Differentiation and attractiveness effects
The following proposition provides comparative statics results when utility indices vary:
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Proposition 7 When ui > uj, Π
∗
i strictly increases with ui and remains constant with uj. Π
∗
j strictly
increases with uj. When ui is increased, Π
∗
j rises if c1 − c2 < 5u1 − u2 and diminishes if the opposite
condition holds.
Proof: By taking again equilibrium profits when u1 ≥ u2, evolution of Π∗1 can be easily observed. The
analysis of Π∗2 is more complex. When u2 varies, the derivative of Π
∗
2 is:
∂Π∗2
∂u2
=
4Nu1x√
∆(
√
∆+ u1)
> 0
with ∆ = u21 + 4u1x and x = u1 + u2 + c1 − c2. When u1 varies, the derivative is:
∂Π∗2
∂u1
=
4Nu1x(u1 +
√
∆− x)√
∆(
√
∆+ u1)2
The condition u1+
√
∆−x > 0 can be rewritten in c1−c2 < 5u1−u2, leading to the threshold mentioned
in the proposition. 
Evolution of profits is determined by two effects. On the one hand, when ui increases, the relative
position of firm i on the market is improved relatively to that of firm j because its product is more
attractive: this attractiveness effect increases Πi and decreases Πj . On the other hand, an increase in ui
affects the degree of substitutability and thus the differentiation between products. If this differentiation
effect is positive, the two profits rise: in the opposite case, they are reduced. These effects can be used
to explain static comparative properties in the DBA model.
When u1 rises, vertical differentiation is increased, whereas horizontal differentiation remains un-
changed. Consequently, Π∗1 grows because firm 1 takes benefit of positive attractiveness and differentiation
effects. Firm 2 is affected by the same positive differentiation effect but also by a negative attractiveness
effect. When the gap of unit costs is low (c1 − c2 < 5u1 − u2), the differentiation effect is dominant and
Π∗2 increases. In the opposite case, the attractiveness effect is dominant and Π
∗
2 decreases.
When u2 increases, horizontal differentiation is strengthened but vertical differentiation weakened:
the sign of the differentiation effect is a priori ambiguous. However, Π∗1 remains unchanged, whereas firm
1 is affected by a negative attractiveness effect: consequently, this differentiation effect is strictly positive.
Moreover, Π∗2 rises as attractiveness and differentiation effects are positive for firm 2.
Finally, in the DBA model, product differentiation is always strengthened when a firm adds new
attributes to its product, whatever its position on the market.
6.2 Comparison with existing models
Spatial models. In a spatial framework, firms’ change of location over the space of characteristics modifies
the type of differentiation. When a firm moves in direction of the middle of the market, new consumers
are attracted: this attractiveness effect increases its profit and reduces that of its rival. The new location
provides a vertical advantage to the moving firm but also reduces horizontal differentiation on the market.
As the distance between varieties diminishes, the global differentiation effect is negative. Consequently,
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when the attractiveness effect is dominant, firms are incited to locate at the middle of the market:
this configuration happens8 when transportation costs are linear (Hotelling, 1929). In contrast, when
the differentiation effect is dominant, firms prefer being located at the extremities of the segment: this
configuration is realized for quadratic transportation costs (d’Aspremont et al., 1979).
Reducing u2 in the DBA model has the same effects that moving in direction of the market centre in
a spatial framework: a vertical differentiation replaces the existing horizontal one and this substitution
diminishes globally product differentiation (reduction of distance between varieties or decrease of the
number of specific attributes). But the two firms are identically affected by these combined effects in the
spatial model, whereas firms have different incentives in the DBA model. Indeed, modifying u1 does not
affect horizontal differentiation when products are described by their attributes.
Deterministic models of differentiation by qualities. In a deterministic duopoly in which the market is
covered (see, for example, Tirole, 1988), equilibrium profits’ properties depend on the quality hierarchy.
When q1 > q2, Π
∗
1 and Π
∗
2 strictly increase with q1 and decrease with q2. An increase in qi clearly
improves the attractiveness of firm i. However, in this framework, an increase in q1 strengthens product
differentiation, whereas an increase in q2 weakens it. As this differentiation effect is dominant here, the
two profits decrease with the gap of qualities.
When products are only differentiated by their qualities in the DBA model, utilities equal u1 = q1−q2
and u2 = 0. As seen previously, the differentiation effect is generally dominant implying that Π
∗
1 and Π
∗
2
increase in u1. Consequently, the traditional comparative static properties of deterministic models can
be found in this special case of the DBA structure.
Multi-dimensional models. In the DBA model, any increase in u2 or u1 entails a positive differentia-
tion effect for reasonable unit cost values. This analysis can be linked with the findings of Neven and
Thisse (1990) in their deterministic model with horizontal and vertical differentiation. These authors
show that each firm chooses a maximum differentiation in a dimension (the “dominant” characteristic)
and a minimum differentiation in the other (“dominated” characteristic). When the vertical character-
istic is dominant, prices increase when varieties are closer: an effect of central localization dominates
the classical effect of price competition. When the horizontal characteristic is dominant, the price of
the low-quality product increases when the gap of quality diminishes, because the quality improvement
weakens the effect of price competition. Thus, in these two cases, the price competitive effect is re-
placed by an effect increasing the differentiation: the central localization and quality effects of Neven and
Thisse can be seen as two facets of the positive global differentiation effect highlighted in the DBA model.
Logit duopoly. Consider a logit duopoly with asymmetric qualities and symmetric costs (Anderson et al.,
1992, p 236). At the price equilibrium, it is easy to show that, for all qi and qj , Π
∗
i increases with qi
and decreases with qj . Thus, in the logit model, the only attractiveness effect matters: the profit of a
8However, there is no perfect equilibrium in the two-stage game with location choice and price competition.
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particular firm increases with its quality and diminishes with its rival’s quality, whatever the effect of
these quality choices on market differentiation. In particular, static comparative properties do not depend
of the quality hierarchy in the model.
Finally, the combination of attractiveness and differentiation effects highlighted in the DBA model
can not be obtained with the other models embodying several forms of differentiation.
7 Conclusion
This paper proposes a discrete choice duopoly in which products are differentiated by their specific
attributes: choice probabilities used are consistent with the classical random decision rule models of Restle
(1961) and Tversky (1972a,b). Price differences are perceived as attributes by consumers, following
the approach suggested by Rotondo (1986). Demand functions constructed by aggregation of choice
probabilities are also consistent with a specific form of heterogeneity in consumers’ preferences. By
setting the attributes at the heart of the decision process of firms and consumers, the model allows for an
intuitive representation of product differentiation. This framework embodies both vertical and horizontal
dimensions, while keeping a rather light formalism.
In this duopoly, the existence of a price Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is demonstrated. Asym-
metric utility indices and unit costs are easily taken into account. Evolution of profits with attributes’
utilities depends on two effects: the first one expresses how the attractiveness of each product is affected
and the second one measures the impact on product differentiation. These effects are combined in a new
way in the DBA duopoly compared to the current models of product differentiation. Indeed, only one
effect matters in the logit duopoly and in the deterministic model with differentiation by qualities. The
two effects play the same role for each firm in a spatial framework whereas their impact is asymmetric in
the DBA structure.
Several extensions of this model remain to explore. First, a study of firms’ attribute choice in a two-
stage game with endogenous unit or fixed costs shows that equilibrium differentiation is both horizontal
and vertical (see Laurent, 2007). Second, an application of the DBA model to an oligopoly with more than
two firms remains to do. However, the analysis becomes less “natural” because several generalizations of
our binomial choice probabilities are possible: for instance, a generalization following the spirit of Restle
will no longer be consistent with Tversky’s Elimination By Aspects model. More generally, it seems that
considering credible decision rules used by consumers to choose among a set of complex products leads
also to a more general framework to describe differentiation in the market. That is why it would be
interesting to develop new differentiated oligopolies by considering the other heuristics that may be used
by consumers in such an environment.
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9 Appendix 1: best response functions
9.1 Best response functions conditional to the price hierarchy
It is supposed that the two firms are active on the market. The local best response functions high-
lighted here depend on the the price hierarchy retained. Which price pi constitutes the best response of
firm i knowing the price pj of its rival?
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Best response in pi ≥ pj .
When pi ≥ pj , the profit of i is given by: Πi = Nui(pi − ci)
(ui + uj + pi − pj) − Fi
For firm i, the first derivative is:
∂Πi
∂pi
=
Nui(ui + uj + ci − pj)
(ui + uj + pi − pj)2
The sign of this derivative does not depend on the value of pi and there are three cases:
- If pj < ui + uj + ci, then
∂Πi
∂pi
> 0 and the best response is p∗i (pj)→ +∞.
- If pj = ui + uj + ci, then
∂Πi
∂pi
= 0 and the best response belongs to an interval p∗i (pj) ∈ [pj ; +∞[.
- If pj > ui + uj + ci, then
∂Πi
∂pi
< 0 and the best response is p∗i (pj) = pj .
Best response in pi ≤ pj .
When pj ≥ pi, the profit of firm i is given by Πi = N(ui + pj − pi)(pi − ci)
ui + uj + pj − pi − Fi
The first derivative is:
∂Πi
∂pi
=
N [(ui + uj + pj − pi)(ui + pj − pi)− uj(pi − ci)]
(ui + uj + pj − pi)2
This function has a single extremum whose expression is :
∂Πi
∂pi
= 0⇔ p2i − 2pi(ui + uj + pj) + (ui + pj)(ui + uj + pj) + ujci = 0
Only one root of this polynomial verifies pj ≥ pi (the other never respects this hierarchy):
pci (pj) = ui + uj + pj −
√
uj(ui + uj + pj − ci)
It is studied if this extremum is a maximum:
∂2Πi
∂p2i
∣∣∣∣
∂Πi
∂pi
=0
=
2N(pi − ui − uj − pj)
(ui + uj + pj − pi)2
This derivative is always negative in the interval pj ≥ pi and profit is thus quasi-concave. Moreover,
pci (pj) is into the interval of definition if:
pj ≥ ui(ui + uj)
uj
+ ci (9.1)
The best response function can thus take two possible forms:
- if pj >
ui(ui + uj)
uj
+ ci, the profit is quasi-concave in the interval and the best response is:
p∗i (pj) = ui + uj + pj −
√
uj(ui + uj + pj − ci)
- if pj ≤ ui
uj
ui + uj + ci, the profit is increasing in the interval and the best response is p
∗
i (pj) = pj .
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9.2 Non-conditional best response functions
From local to global reaction functions: From the conditional (or “local”) reaction functions, it is possible
to establish each firm’s best response function whatever the price hierarchy. However, the condition (9.1)
underlines that the shape of the reaction function depends on the hierarchy of specific attributes utilities,
as it is shown now.
Suppose that pj ≥ ui(ui + uj)
uj
+ ci which implies that Πi is quasi-concave on [0; pj ].
- If ui ≥ uj , we have necessarily pj > ui + uj + ci and thus Πi is strictly decreasing on [pj ; +∞]. In this
case, profit functions being continuous, the global maximum is well identified: it is the local maximum
of the interval [0; pj ].
- if ui ≤ uj , it is possible that pj < ui+uj + ci (the opposite inequality can also be true). In this case, Πi
is strictly increasing on [pj ; +∞] and there are two local equilibria in the intervals [0; pj ] and [pj ; +∞].
A complementary analysis is required to identify which local maximum is the global one.
Thus, the combination of local reaction functions to determine the global one requires to define a hi-
erarchy between ui and uj because reaction functions are asymmetric. Without loss of generality, assume
now (and for the rest of the proof) that ui ≥ uj . Firm i’s global best response function is defined before
that of firm j.
Global best response function of firm i. Under the assumption ui ≥ uj , the best response function of i is:
a) if pj >
ui(ui + uj)
uj
+ ci, or pj =
ui(ui + uj)
uj
+ ci and ui > uj , Πi is quasi-concave in [0; pj ] and strictly
decreasing in [pj ; +∞[. In this case, the best response function of i is
p∗i (pj) = ui + uj + pj −
√
uj(ui + uj + pj − ci) which verifies pi ≤ pj . (Case I1)
b) if ui > uj and ui + uj + ci < pj <
ui(ui + uj)
uj
+ ci, Πi is strictly increasing in [0; pj ] and strictly
decreasing in [pj ; +∞[. In this case, the best response of i is “on the kink”: p∗i (pj) = pj . (Case I2)
c) if pj = ui + uj + ci, Πi is strictly increasing in [0; pj ] and constant in [pj ; +∞[. The best response
belongs to the interval p∗i (pj) ∈ [pj ; +∞[. (Case I3)
d) if pj < ui + uj + ci, Πi is strictly increasing in all the interval of definition and the best response is
p∗i (pj)→ +∞. (Case I4).
Global best response function of firm j. The global best response function of j is now highlighted, with
always ui ≥ uj .
- If pi > ui + uj + cj , or pi = ui + uj + cj with ui > uj , Πj is quasi-concave on [0; pi] and decreasing
or constant in [pi; +∞]. Profit function being continuous, the best response is necessarily p∗j (pi) =
ui + uj + pi −
√
ui(ui + uj + pi − cj) which verifies pj ≤ pi.
- If ui > uj and
uj(ui + uj)
ui
+ cj < pi < ui+uj + cj , Πj is quasi-concave on [0; pi] and strictly increasing
in [pi; +∞]. There are two local maximum and profits must be compared in order to identify the global
one.
When pj = ui + uj + pi −
√
ui(ui + uj + pi − cj) (local maximum in [0; pi]), the profit equals:
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Πcj =
N(
√
ui + uj + pi − cj − ui)2
ui
When pj → +∞ (local maximum in [pi; +∞]), the profit is:
Πccj = Nuj
The comparison of profits leads to the following condition:
Πcj > Π
cc
j ⇔ pi > 2
√
uiuj + cj
Moreover, it is easy to show that
uj
ui
(ui + uj) < 2
√
uiuj < ui + uj when ui > uj .
When
uj(ui + uj)
ui
+ cj < pi < 2
√
uiuj + cj , the global maximum is the second local one, verifying
pj → +∞.
When 2
√
uiuj + cj < pi < ui + uj + cj , the global maximum is the first local one, verifying
pj = ui + uj + pi −
√
ui(ui + uj + pi − cj).
When pi = 2
√
uiuj + cj , the two local maxima lead to the same profit.
- If pi = ui+ uj + cj and ui = uj , Πj is strictly increasing in [0; pi] and constant in [pi; +∞[ and the best
response belongs to the interval p∗j (pi) ∈ [pi; +∞[.
- If pi <
uj(ui + uj)
ui
+ cj or if pi =
uj(ui + uj)
ui
+ cj with ui > uj , Πj is strictly increasing on all the
interval of definition and the best response is: p∗j (pi)→ +∞.
These results can now be re-organized in a more practical way:
a) if pi > 2
√
uiuj+cj , then the global maximum is in the interval [0; pi] in which the profit is quasi-concave
and the best response of j is:
p∗j (pi) = ui + uj + pi −
√
ui(ui + uj + pi − cj) which verifies pj ≤ pi. (case J1)
b) if pi = 2
√
uiuj + cj and ui > uj , there are two local maxima and the best response is either p
∗
j (pi) =
ui + uj + pi −
√
ui(ui + uj + pi − cj) or p∗j (pi)→ +∞. (case J2)
c) if pi = 2
√
uiuj + cj and ui = uj , then the profit is strictly increasing in [0; pi] and constant in [pi; +∞[
and the best response belongs to the interval p∗j (pi) ∈ [pi; +∞[. (case J3)
d) if pi < 2
√
uiuj + cj , then the global maximum is reached in the interval [pi; +∞[ in which the profit
is increasing and the best response of j is p∗j (pi)→ +∞. (Case J4)
10 Appendix 2: existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium
10.1 Existence of the equilibrium
The Nash price equilibrium is given by the intersection of best response functions: this section demon-
strates that an equilibrium in pi ≥ pj exists when conditions (4.3) and (4.4) hold (the proof of uniqueness
is realized in the following section).
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On the one hand, intersection of global reaction functions in I3 and J3 leads to the symmetric price
equilibrium pi = pj . When ui = uj (case J3), firm i chooses an identical price only if pj = 2u+ ci (case
I3). The condition ci = cj = c is thus necessary for the existence of a symmetric equilibrium. In this
case, p∗i (pj) = 2u+ c is one of the best responses of firm i and a weak price Nash equilibrium is achieved.
On the other hand, the intersection of global reaction functions in I3 and J1 leads to the asymmetric
price equilibrium pi > pj . I3 implies that: p
c
j = ui + uj + ci. The value of pi such that the reaction
function of j in case J1 leads to the choice of such a pcj is studied now. By using this reaction function,
it is shown that pi must verify pi − ci =
√
ui(ui + uj + pi − cj). This equation may be rewritten as the
following second degree polynomial: p2i −pi(ui+2ci)−ui(ui+uj−cj)+c2i . Only one root verifies pi > pj :
pci = ((ui +
√
∆)/2) + ci with ∆ = u
2
i + 4ui(ui + uj + ci − cj). An additional comment concerning the
special case in which ui > uj = 0 is useful: firm i can force firm j to exit the market by choosing pi = p
c
j
(as in pure vertical differentiation) but such a deviation is not strictly profitable for i and thus is not
realized. Finally, pci is the global best response of i for any ui and uj .
But this price should also verify the inequality pi ≥ 2√uiuj+ cj so that firm j really chooses pcj in the
case J1. And this condition is verified if and only if ci − cj ≥ √uiuj − ui (positivity of ∆ is guaranteed).
Prices are within the intervals of definition of the cases I3 and J1 and then constitute a Nash equilibrium.
By combining conditions of existence of symmetric and asymmetric Nash equilibria, equations (4.3) and
(4.4) are obtained.
10.2 Uniqueness of the equilibrium
This section proves the uniqueness of the equilibrium highlighted previously. First, the proof is realized
under the assumption that two firms are active. Second, the absence of equilibrium with only one active
firm is established.
Uniqueness with two active firms. On the one hand, the only local reaction function of j consistent with
a symmetric equilibrium belongs to J3 and this function verifies p∗j (pi) = pi if and only if ui = uj = u
and pi = 2u+ cj . For firm i, reactions functions in cases I2 and I3 may verify p
∗
i (pj) = pj but only I3 is
consistent with ui = uj = u which demonstrates the uniqueness of the symmetric equilibrium.
On the other hand, there is no asymmetric equilibrium with pi → +∞ and pj → +∞. Indeed, if firm
i sets pi → +∞, the best response of j is p∗j (pi) = p = ui + uj + pi −
√
ui(ui + uj + pi − cj). Moreover
lim
pi→+∞
p→ +∞, which violates the condition pj < ui+uj+ ci under which firm i would choose this price
pi → +∞ (the demonstration is similar for pj → +∞). The cases I4, J2 and J4 are thus eliminated from
the analysis. The only equilibrium possible in case I2 is symmetric because the best response is on the
kink: this case is also excluded here.
Moreover, an asymmetric equilibrium can not exist in case J3. First, the only equilibrium corre-
sponding to the intersection of I3 and J3 is a symmetric one, previously highlighted. Second, con-
sider the intersection of I1 and J3. J3 implies that ui = uj = u and pi = 2u + cj . J1 implies that
p∗i (pj) = 2u + pj −
√
u(2u+ pj − ci). The equality pi = p∗i (pj) implies that pj = 2u + cj = pi which is
not an asymmetric equilibrium.
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Consequently, the only possible asymmetric equilibrium necessarily corresponds to the case J1 coupled
with the case I3 (I1 is never compatible with J1), which proves the uniqueness of the equilibrium when
two firms are active.
Non-existence of monopoly equilibrium. It is demonstrated here that no monopoly equilibrium exists
under conditions (4.3) and (4.4). When uj > 0, firm j always keeps a small market share whatever the
price it chooses. But if ui > uj = 0 and cj > ci, it seems not implausible that a “limit pricing” monopoly
exists in which i chooses pi = cj .
In this case, Πj = 0 and there is no price pj such that firm j can make a positive profit. The monopoly
profit of i is Πmi = N(cj − ci) and firm i is never incited to decrease its price. However, if firm i increases
its price and chooses pi = cj + ε with ε ≥ 0, firm j becomes active and i obtains a lower demand but a
higher unit margin. As price difference is now ε, the new profit of firm i is given by:
Πcci =
Nui(cj + ε− ci)
ui + ε
A monopoly equilibrium exists if and only if the maximum of Πcci is reached for ε = 0. The derivative
of the profit function leads to:
∂Πcci
∂ε
=
Nui(ui − cj − ci)
(ui + ε)2
(10.1)
But when uj = 0, (4.4) is rewritten as ci−cj ≥ −ui and this derivative is always positive: consequently,
there is no monopoly equilibrium under (4.4). As there exists a unique equilibrium with two active firms
and no equilibrium with one active firm, the proof of uniqueness claimed in Proposition 5 is now completed.
11 Appendix 3: proof of Proposition 6
This proof is realized easily by complementarity with the analysis carried out in the previous section.
When uj > 0, firm j is never outside the market, even if its price is high, because differentiation is
partially horizontal and some consumers always prefer product j. But when uj = 0, this effect vanishes.
In a monopoly framework, firm i sets pi = cj and firm j is out of the market: profits are Πj = 0 and
Πmi = N(cj − ci). A monopoly equilibrium exists if the derivative (10.1) is always negative. As shown
previously, this property is always true if (4.4) is violated. As there is no equilibrium with two active
firms, the monopoly equilibrium highlighted here is unique.
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